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SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS*
Katherine Shaw Spaht**
DISINHERISON
An additional ground for disinherison was added to the current list
by Act 456 of the 1985 Legislative Session. The twelfth ground for
disinherison of a child by his parent is "[ilf the child has known how
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Much could be written about two court of appeal decisions concerning collation
and when it is due: Succession of Dittmar, 458 So. 2d 163 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984) and
Succession of Lomonaco, 465 So. 2d 781 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985). In Succession of
Dittmar, supra at 166, the court opined: "It cannot be determined whether a collation
debt may be due until the value of the estate as a whole is finally fixed in the succession
proceedings and action is taken to have the succession property partitioned." In Succession
of Lomonaco, supra at 784, the court first distinguished "fictitious" from "actual"
collation, the latter defined as a "return in fact to the succession by the descending
forced heir of property he has received from the ancestor by donations." "Actual"
collation, according to the court, is "an incident of the partitioning of a succession."
The demand in Succession of Lomonaco, supra, was treated as a demand for "fictitious"
collation, defined as a demand "made in order to calculate the actual mass of the
successions to enable the executor to determine the legitime of the forced heirs, and
subsequently to determine whether that legitime has been impinged upon." Id.
The quotations excerpted from the two cases illustrate the courts' confusion of the
action for collation (La. Civ. Code arts. 1227-1288) and the action for reduction (La.
Civ. Code arts. 1502-1518). Furthermore, "fictitious" collation to calculate the active
mass of the succession is nothing more than deciding whether or not the ancestor made
a donation to the forced heir under La. Civ. Code art. 1505. In addition to the confusion
of reduction, collation, and the active mass calculation under article 1505, the court
concluded that collation is incident to a partition of succession property under La. Civ.
Code arts. 1331-1335, even though the jurisprudence has established that a demand for
collation can not be entertained after a judgment of possession is rendered. Kinney v.
Kinney, 150 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) (citing Doll v. Doll, 206 La. 550, 19
So. 2d 249 (1944)). The articles on partition of successions are seldom relied upon in
practice (except for the substantive principles of the law of co-ownership). Many of the
articles were superseded or replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure articles on successions.
La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2811-3462. Because of the complexity of interrelated issues,
Succession of Dittmar and Succession of Lomonaco deserve more lengthy evaluation and
development. The two cases, among others, will be the subject of a forthcoming article
to be published on collation. See generally, Comment, The Louisiana Concept of Res
Judicata, 34 La. L. Rev. 763 (1974); Comment, Some Aspects of Collation, 34 La. L.
Rev. 782 (1974).
** Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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to contact the parent, but has failed without just cause to communicate
with the parent for a period of two years after attaining the age of
majority, except when the child is on active duty in any of the military
forces of the United States."' Ascendants other than parents were denied
the availability of the twelfth ground for disinheriting grandchildren and
greatgrandchildren.2 Denial of the ground for disinherison to other as-
cendants is a reasonable position considering the fact that society no
longer recognizes the cohesiveness of the extended family. A grandchild,
either during the life of his parent (the forced heir) or thereafter, may
fail to communicate with his grandparent for a period of two years
after his majority without intending disrespect and in conformity with
normal societal behavior.
Much of the impetus for liberalizing the grounds for disinherison
must be attributed to the proponents of forced heirship who recom-
mended alternatives to abolition of the institution.3 During the legislative
session, as has been the case for the past four years, bills were introduced
to amend the Louisiana Constitution by repealing the provision which
prohibits the Legislature from abolishing forced heirship. 4 The bill in-
troduced in the House of Representatives5 received an unfavorable com-
mittee recommendation, and the Senate bill was never heard. 6 The
legislative climate at the time Act 456 was passed becomes important
in deciding how to interpret its amendments to the articles on disin-
herison. The avowed purpose of the authors of House Bill 111, which
became Act 456, was to make disinherison less difficult for a parent
under the enumerated grounds. Those legislators voting for House Bill
111, which passed, and against House Bill 115, which did not, concluded
that a more permissive statutory scheme of disinherison is superior to
repealing forced heirship. Against such a background, the new ground
for disinherison should be interpreted liberally.
In addition to the legislative climate, the amendments to the dis-
inherison articles provide further support for such a conclusion. The
following language was added to article 1621 after the listing of grounds
1. 1985 La. Acts No. 456.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 1622 (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 456):
The ascendants may disinherit their descendants, coming to their succession, for
the first nine and the eleventh causes expressed in the preceding article, when
the acts there mentioned have been committed toward them or toward the
parents, but they can not disinherit their descendants for the tenth or twelfth
cause.
3. See Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Successions
and Donations, 45 La. L. Rev. 575, 595-604 (1984); Lemann, In Defense of Forced
Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 20 (1977).
4. La. Const. art. XII § 5.
5. H.B. 115, 1985 Reg. Sess.
6. S.B. 42, 1985 Reg. Sess.
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for disinherison: "There shall be a rebuttable presumption as to the
facts set out in the act of disinherison to support these causes." 7 Thus,
the will that must contain the testator's reason for disinheriting his
forced heir' may also include the relevant facts which shall be presumed
true. The presumption being expressly rebuttable, the burden of per-
suasion falls upon the forced heir "to prove that the cause stipulated
for disinherison did not exist." 9
The presumption as applied to the new ground for disinherison
imposes the burden of persuasion on the heir to prove (1) he did
communicate with the parent and, furthermore, that two consecutive0
years did not elapse between such communications; or (2) he did not
know how to contact the parent;" or (3) his failure to so communicate
was with just cause.' 2 As to other grounds, the heir must prove such
conduct did not occur-for example, the child did not strike the parent, 3
or treat the parent cruelly, 4 or attempt to take the parent's life.' 5 The
burden of proving that disrespectful conduct did not occur, which is a
significant change in the law,' is somewhat analogous to the burden
borne by the spouse who seeks alimony after divorce 7 to prove that
7. La. Civ. Code art. 1621 (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 456).
8. La. Civ. Code art. 1624 (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 456):
The testator shall express in the will for what reasons he disinherited his forced
heirs or any of them, and the forced heir so disinherited is obliged to prove
that the cause stipulated for disinherison did not exist or that he was reconciled
with the testator after the act or circumstance alleged to constitute the cause
for disinherison.
9. Id.
10. The legislation does not specifically require that the two years be consecutive but
that surely was the intention. The language utilized to express the twelfth ground resembles
strongly that found in La. R.S. 9:422.1(3) (Supp. 1985), which has been interpreted to
require two consecutive years of a failure to communicate. Adoption of Dore, 469 So.
2d 491 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); In re May, 441 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
II. A condition of the twelfth ground for disinherison is that the child know how
to contact the parent. La. Civ. Code art. 1621 (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 456):
"12. If the child has known how to contact the parent ......
12. The failure to communicate must be without just cause, which is identical to the
provisions of La. R.S. 9:422.1(3) (Supp. 1985): "The other legitimate parent has refused
or failed to visit, communicate, or attempt to communicate with the child, without just
cause, for a period of two years." See discussion in text, infra at notes 24-41.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 1621(l).
14. La. Civ. Code art. 1621(2).
15. La. Civ. Code art. 1621(3).
16. La. Civ. Code art. 1624: "The testator must express in the will for what reasons
he disinherited his forced heirs or any of them, and the other heirs of the testator are
moreover obliged to prove the facts on which the disinherison is founded; otherwise it
is null."
17. La. Civ. Code art. 160: "A. When a spouse has not been at fault and has not
sufficient means for support ......
1986]
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he or she was without any fault which would be sufficient to entitle
the other spouse to a separation or divorce." As has been observed
elsewhere, "if the grounds for disinherison were the failure of the
disinherited heir to act, such as his failure to communicate with the
testator parent for a period of years, shifting of the burden of persuasion
would be appropriate and would make disinherison easier."' 9
What constitutes a communication by the child with his parent may
present difficulties if some qualitative standard is applied. Communi-
cation surely includes "cards, letters, . . . gifts," 20 telephone calls, tel-
egrams, or similar modes. Since the forced heir will bear the burden
of persuading the judge that he did communicate with his parent, it
would be advisable for the heir to have independent corroboration of
the communication, such as a letter sent certified mail, return receipt
requested. If the fact of communication is established, the question
remains whether the letter, for example, must meet some qualitative
standard. Must the contents of the letter be examined to determine if
it is respectful? Should a letter from a child who denounces the parent
in derogatory and abusive language be treated as a communication? The
answer must be that the contents of the communication will be examined
to assure that the child has been respectful toward the parent. However,
the contents of the communication need not be considered ineffective
if the child chooses to disagree or argue with a parent, since a child
of the age of majority is no longer under an obligation to obey his
parent, only to respect him. 2'
Disinherison for failure to communicate only applies in instances
where the child is a major. This limitation assures that the child will
not suffer from a failure or refusal by another person, such as a tutor
if the parents are separated or divorced,2 2 to communicate with or to
permit the child to communicate with the parent. Another exception to
the non-communication ground is if the child is on active duty in any
of the military forces of the United States. 23 Although in many instances
18. Adams v. Adams, 389 So. 2d 381 (La. 1980); La. Civ. Code arts. 138-139. See
discussion in Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 3, at 602-03.
19. Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 3, at 603.
20. In re May, 441 So. 2d 500, 504 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
21. La. Civ. Code arts. 215, 217, and 218.
22. La. Civ. Code arts. 246, 248, and 250.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 1621 (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 456):
The just causes for which parents may disinherit their children are twelve in
number. There shall be a rebuttable presumption as to the facts set out in the
act of disinherison to support these causes. These causes are, to wit:
12. If the child has known how to contact the parent, but has failed without
just cause to communicate with the parent for a period of two years after
attaining the age of majority, except when the child is on active duty in any
of the military forces of the United States.
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the failure to communicate while in military service may have been
excused as "just cause," the legislative assumption made by the statutory
exception is that the child is unable to communicate either as a practical
matter or as a matter of national security. Obviously, there will be
instances in which the child on active duty in the military will be excused
from communicating with the parent even though there was no practical
or security reason preventing him from doing so.
The heir may also prove as a defense to disinherison that his failure
to communicate was with "just cause." "Just cause" explicitly provided
by the statute includes lack of knowledge concerning how to contact
the parent 24 and active military service. 25 Other examples of "just cause"
can be borrowed perhaps from the statute dispensing with the natural
parent's consent to an adoption.2 6 A condition of the parent's failure
to communicate with the child which makes his consent to the adoption
unnecessary is that the failure to communicate be without just cause.
A survey of the jurisprudence interpreting the adoption provision reveals
that parents have urged the following circumstances as just cause: in-
carceration,2 7 drug addiction, 2 and emotional state. 29 Incarceration urged
24. La. Civ. Code art. 1621 (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 456): "12. If the
child has known how to contact the parent ......
Consider in connection with this statutory excuse from failure to communicate, the
dilemma of an adopted child who does not know the identity of his biological parent.
The child cannot discover the parent's identity unless he can prove a compelling necessity
(which inheritance as a forced heir may be). Even if the child proves a compelling
necessity, a curator is appointed to examine the original birth certificate to determine to
what extent it is necessary to release the information to the adopted child. La. R.S. 40:81
(Supp. 1977); Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979), discussed in Spaht, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Persons, 40 La. L.
Rev. 543, 554-58 (1980). However, for the adopted child who does know the identity of
his biological parent-for example, in the case of a stepparent adoption where the natural
parent has forfeited his right to consent by his conduct under La. R.S. 9:422.1 (Supp.
1985)-it is imperative under the literal language of the new grounds that the child
communicate with the parent every two years so as not to lose the right of inheritance
retained under La. Civ. Code art. 214.
The child who potentially has two fathers, in the case where the husband of the
mother is presumed to be the father under La. Civ. Code art. 184 and another man has
legitimated, acknowledged, or been allowed to establish his filiation under La. Civ. Code
art. 209, must communicate with both so as to retain his inheritance rights as a forced
heir in their successions. See, e.g., Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975);
Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974); but see, Griffin v. Succession of Branch,
452 So. 2d 344 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984), writs granted, 458 So. 2d 108 (La. 1984).
25. La. Civ. Code art. 1621 (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 456).
26. La. R.S. 9:422.1(3) (Supp. 1985).
27. State v. Jones, 373 So. 2d 1331 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); In re Brannon, 340
So. 2d 654 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
28. In re Daboval, 377 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 380 So.
2d 101 (La 1980).
29. State ex rel. Haynes, 368 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 2d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. on
other grounds, Haynes v. Mangham, 375 So. 2d 103 (La. 1979).
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as just cause for failure to communicate with a child was rejected by
the court: "We would think that a father situated such as this who
had a real concern for his children would recognize that, in order to
maintain a relationship under these circumstances, an extra effort is
necessary." 30 The same should be true if the child is incarcerated and
fails to communicate with the parent. It is also obvious that the Leg-
islature intended to place the burden of making the effort to commu-
nicate on the child, since failure, not refusal, to communicate is the
ground for disinherison. In the two cases where drug addiction3 and
the emotional state of the parent32 were offered as "just cause" for
failure to communicate or pay support,33 the issue was avoided by the
court.
In deciding what constitutes just cause for failure to communicate
by the child, the child's psychological state of mind presents the most
difficulty. Drug addiction with its accompanying dependency and anxiety,
other serious psychiatric problems that can be clinically identified, or
psychological disturbances created by such events as an argument with
the parent or a stepparent may be urged by the heir as "just cause." '3 4
Consider, for example, the factual circumstances of Succession of Lan-
dry.3" If the case had been decided under Civil Code article 1621 as
amended, the heir would have been compelled to argue "just cause"
for his failure to communicate with his mother from 1947 until her
death in 1980.36 The "just cause" for his failure to communicate was
an acrimonious incident involving the removal of the heir's refrigerator
from an apartment owned by his mother. In her will the mother wrote,
" 'My son, Wilbert, never apologized for striking me or for the above
referred to attack upon me and although he has always lived in the
City of New Orleans or the Greater New Orleans Area, he has never
come to see his mother even on many occasions (sic) when I was confined
30. In re May, 441 So. 2d 500, 505 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
31. In re Daboval, 377 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 380 So.
2d 101 (La. 1980). See also State v. Jones, 373 So. 2d 1331 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
32. State ex rel. Haynes, 368 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 2d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. on
other grounds, Haynes v. Mangham, 375 So. 2d 103 (La. 1979).
33. La. R.S. 9:422.1(1), (2) (Supp. 1985).
34. Adoption of Dore, 469 So. 2d 491 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985). Under La. R.S.
9:422.1(3) (Supp. 1985), the father claimed that his failure to communicate with the child
was justified because (1) the divorce decree did not establish visitation rights, and (2) the
mother only allowed him to visit in her home, with her and her new spouse present. The
court ultimately found that the failure to communicate was without just cause. According
to the court, the parent's failure to communicate must be due to factors beyond his
control.
35. 463 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
36. "It is uncontroverted that Wilbert and his mother did not reconcile after their
argument in 1947. They did not speak or see each other." Id. at 684.
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to the hospital because of a heart condition or other physical ills.' ""
The court suggested in its opinion that the mother was as much at fault
as the child in failing to heal the breach: "Respect between parent and
child is a mutual obligation.' ' 8
However, in Succession of Landry, the executrix was seeking to
prove that the disinherited heir had been guilty of cruelty to his mother.3 9
The court responded to the allegations of cruel treatment in the following
manner: "An argument which results in prolonged indifference by both
parties cannot be characterized as 'cruelty' by one of the parties." 40 It
then added gratuitously, "[d]isinherison cannot result from a child's
failure to communicate with a parent." 4'
The law has changed. Because the legislation now imposes a re-
sponsibility upon the child to communicate with a parent, an argument
that creates strained relations with the parent should not constitute "just
cause." The communication by the child need not apologize to the
parent for an argument where both parties were at fault, but it should
be respectful in tone, as was previously discussed. Furthermore, reliance
upon the jurisprudence interpreting "just cause" under the adoption
statute should proceed cautiously because the policies underlying adoption
and disinherison differ substantially. Whereas the adoption statutes dis-
pensing with the natural parent's consent must be strictly construed as
in derogation of the natural parent's rights, the disinherison legislation
should be interpreted liberally to permit a parent greater freedom in
disinheriting an unworthy child. The motivation of the law regulating
parent-child relations4 2 is to assure the natural parent the opportunity
to establish strong emotional ties to the child. If the parent is dead,
there is no reason to deny the disinherison to encourage such emotional
relationship. Yet, balanced against the strict interpretation of the adop-
tion statutes is a consideration also not present in the laws on disin-
herison-the critical need to provide a stable, warm, loving environment
for the minor child.
The forced heir is also permitted to establish reconciliation with his
parent as a defense to any of the twelve grounds. For the first time
reconciliation is referred to in the legislation, 43 although it has been
recognized by the jurisprudence since 1941.44 Reconciliation, referred to
37. Id. at 683.
38. Id. at 684.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 1621(3).
40. 463 So. 2d at 684.
41. Id.
42. La. Civ. Code arts. 215-237.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 1624 (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 456). For the text
of this article, see supra note 8.
44. Succession of Lissa, 198 La. 129, 3 So. 2d 534 (1941); La. Civ. Code art. 1710.
See also discussion in Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 3, at 603-04.
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in Civil Code article 152,'4 means essentially forgiveness, and the jur-
isprudence contains examples of the type of conduct implying forgiveness 46
and the type of conduct that does not. 47
The new ground for disinherison can be asserted in successions if
the testator dies after September 6, 1985, the effective date of Act 456.
The rights of forced heirs vest only at the moment of the testator's
death.4 1 In Hughes v. Murdock,49 the court, foreseeing legislation such
as Act 456, opined:
No one can be said to have any vested right in any existing
legal capacity, in reference to any future contract or advantage
to result from that capacity. He who to-day is by law a forced
heir, in expectancy, may to-morrow, by a new law, be declared
liable to be disinherited by will, or incapable even of succeeding
ab intestato. It may be assumed, as a general rule, that the
mere capacity or incapacity of particular classes of persons to
contract or to inherit depends upon the legislative will.5 0
Even though the conduct of the heir occurred before the effective
date of the legislation and was not considered specifically offensive, 51
the testator may utilize the new grounds for disinherison. So if the
testator drafts a will disinheriting the heir for failure to communicate
and dies after September 6, 1985, it is an example of the immediate
45. La. Civ. Code art. 152: "The action of separation shall be extinguished by the
reconciliation of the parties, either after the facts which might have given ground to such
action, or after the action has been commenced."
46. Succession of Lissa, 198 La. 129, 3 So. 2d 534 (1941).
47. Succession of Chaney, 413 So. 2d 936 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
48. La. Civ. Code art. 934; Henry v. Jean, 238 La. 314, 326, 115 So. 2d 363, 367
(1959). In I M. Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil No. 247, at 177 (12th ed. La
St. L. Inst. trans. 1959), the author states: "The attribution of property in virtue of the
testament is accomplished on the contrary, only on the day of the death of the testator.
The consequence is that if, during this interval, a law comes into being which reduces
the. disposable portion of the estate, it is applicable."
49. 45 La. Ann. 935, 13 So. 182 (1893) (syllabus of court). See also Hyde v. Planters
Bank, 8 Rob. 416 (La. 1844).
50. Hughes v. Murdock, 45 La. Ann. at 935, 13 So. at 182. Obviously, what the
court said concerning the legislative will being determinative of the particular class of
persons that will inherit was before the constitutional provisions prohibiting the Legislature
from abolishing forced heirship. La. Const. art. XII, § 5 (1974); La. Const. art. IV, §
16 (1921).
51. Despite what the court says in Succession of Landry, if the failure to communicate
is not the parent's fault, it should be considered cruel treatment, just as indifference and
neglect are treated as cruel treatment under La. Civ. Code art. 138(3). See Dollar v.
Dollar, 159 La. 219, 105 So. 296 (1925); R. Pascal & K. Spaht, Louisiana Family Law
Course 151 (3d ed. 1982); Comment, The Degree of Cruelty Necessary to Justify Separation
from Bed and Board in Louisiana, 16 La. L. Rev. 533 (1956).
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application of the law drawing upon antecedent facts.5 2 An analogy
would be a new ground for divorce based upon the spouses' living
separate and apart for a period of time which occurred before the
effective date of such legislation. In Hurry v. Hurry,5" the court awarded
the husband a divorce based upon the fact that the spouses had lived
separate and apart, even though they had done so before the effective
date of the legislation. Arguments by the wife that application of the
new legislation would be unconstitutional because it denied her property
without due process and divested her of vested rights were rejected.
Disinherison, like divorce, is an instance described by Planiol where
judicial intervention is necessary, for no one is disinherited until adjudged
so.54 In such a case, "if intervention of a court is necessary to bring
about a new juridical situation (for example, divorce or separation of
property) there will be no retroactivity and the court will apply the law
in force at the time judgment is pronounced." 55
By choosing to liberalize the laws on disinherison rather than to
repeal the constitutional provision protecting forced heirship, the Leg-
islature weighed the policies underlying the legitime 6 against the ad-
vantages of free testation. The scales tipped in favor of forced heirship,
but not without necessary concessions to those parents of children who
purposely ignore their parents, thus rendering themselves unworthy to
inherit. The institution of forced heirship has survived another year.
52. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 48, No. 243A, at 175.
53. 144 La. 877, 81 So. 2d 378 (1919).
54. La. Civ. Code arts. 1498 and 1624.
55. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 48, No. 243A, at 175.
56. Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 3, at 591-95.
19861

